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The Holodook decision is based upon a.policy against increasing
the burdens of parenthood. In view of the many difficulties encountered in raising children, a court is naturally reluctant to impose a
monetary liability on a parent who fails to protect a child from injury.
Such a liability seems all the more undesirable in the case of a parent
of a mentally or physically defective child. Nothing should be done to
increase the already enormous burdens of such parents. It is hoped
that the otherwise beneficial Dole rule will not have this unfortunate
effect. Holodook promises that it will not.
Insurance Law § 167(3)
Conflicting decisions continue as to the effect of section 167(3) of
the Insurance Law in the context of a Dole claim for indemnity against
the plaintiff's spouse. The section provides that no liability insurance
policy "shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured
because of death or injury to his or her spouse." 223 The line of division
between the cases has been whether or not the intent of section 167(3)
224
should be re-examined in light of Dole.
225
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Westlake,
the Supreme Court, Nassau County, refused to do so. In this case, the
defendants against whom the insured and his spouse had brought suit
instituted a third-party action against the insured for apportionment
of his spouse's damages. The insurer thereupon sought a declaration of
its liability under the policy. The court acknowledged that the intent
of section 167(3) was to protect insurance companies from collusive
actions between spouses, 2261 and that the possibility of collusion is virtually nonexistent in this situation because the insured spouse would
have to succeed in her action before the defendant's indemnity claim
against the insured arose. 227 Reading the statute broadly, however, the
§ 167(3) (McKinney 1966).
223 N.Y. INS. LA.,.W
224 Compare Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Delosh, 73 Misc. 2d 275, 341 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup.
Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973) (holding section 167(3) inapplicable) with Perno v. Exchange Mut. Ins. Co., 73 Misc. 2d 346, 342 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1973),
and Smith v. Employer's Fire Ins. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 524, 340 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins
County 1972) (holding section 167(8) applicable).
225 74 Misc. 2d 604, 344 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
226 Id. at 605, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 68, quoting New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d
1, 7, 143 N.E2d 357, 360, 163 N.Y.S.2d 626, 631 (1957).
227 Where both spouses are suing on their own behalf, the one against whom indemnity
is sought generally has nothing to gain by deliberately losing the lawsuit because, although
he may be bolstering his spouse's claim, he is defeating his own. It may, however, be worthwhile to do so where his injuries are minor and his spouse's are extensive. See McLaughlin,
New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.L.J. 109, Dec. 8, 1972, at 5, Col. 1-2.
This is, however, distinguishable from the situation in which the spouse against whom
indemnity is sought is not a party-plaintiff to the action. In this case, he has an interest
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court held that the policy did not cover the third-party claim and therefore the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify its insured. A
further basis for the decision was that a finding of liabilty would extend
the contract beyond the original contemplation of the parties.
A case involving similar facts in the Supreme Court, Westchester
County, yielded a contrary result. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Franklin228 was also an action by an insurer for a declaration
regarding coverage. In a prior action by a husband-driver-insured and
his wife-passenger, the defendants had counterclaimed against the husband for Dole apportionment. The court characterized the right of
indemnity against the insured as an independent right based upon the
fact that the insured, by his negligence, had imposed upon the defendants the burden of bearing more than their fair share of damages.
Section 167(8) was thus deemed inapplicable on the theory that the
defendants' right to relative contribution was not based upon the insured's "liability" as the term is used in that section. Moreover, since
there is little likelihood of collusion in this situation, the statute was
not indirectly circumvented. 229 The opinion analogized to the work-

men's compensation area; as Dole itself illustrates, a right to indemnity
against the employer exists in favor of the defendant third-party although a direct suit by the employee against his employer is unavail23 0

able.

The Franklin decision is the more salutary one. The overriding
policies favoring compensation for injuries despite the financial condition of the wrongdoer 231 and equitable apportionment of damages
should control where there is little or no opportunity for collusion, the
prevention of which is the essential purpose of section 167(3). The
fortuitous circumstance that an injured plaintiff is the spouse of the
in "throwing the lawsuit" and section 167(3) of the Insurance Law applies to prevent fraud.
See, e.g., Reis v. Economy Hotels and Restaurants, Inc., 4 Misc. 2d 146, 155 N.Y.S.2d 713
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1956); General Acc. Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Katz, 3 Misc. 2d
328, 150 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1956).
228 74 Misc. 2d 506, 344 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973).
229 See note 227 supra.
230 See Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Estates, 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d
567 (1938). The weakness of this analogy is that a right of action by an employee against
his employer is barred by N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1965), whereas
interspousal suits are still available and all section 167(3) of the Insurance Law does is
absolve the insurer from liability in the action. McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice,
168 N.Y.L.J. 109, Dec. 8, 1972, at 5, col. 2. But the thrust of the analogy is that the claim
over in each case is purely for indemnity, and therefore any impediments to a direct suit
between the plaintiff and third-party defendant should not apply.
231 344 Misc. 2d at 512, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 256, citing as evidence of this policy N.Y. INs.
LAw § 312 (McKinney 1966) (which provides for broad compulsory automobile liability
insurance coverage) and N.Y. INS. LAw art. 17-A (McKinney 1966) (which created the
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation).
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other driver, whose negligence contributed to the accident, should not
strip the defendant of his right to obtain apportionment. While it is of
course true that a Dole claim against the other driver individually is
still available, the absence of insurance may effectively make this an
empty right. Where the defendant's own liability insurance coverage
is exceeded by the amount of the plaintiff's judgment, he will be forced
to pay from his own pocket more than he would have if the automobile
with which he collided were occupied by an unmarried couple.
Dole and its progeny have necessitated a complete re-examination
of section 167(3) by the Legislature. In the interim, however, the courts
should be sensitive to the fact that apportionment of damages among
wrongdoers on the basis of their relative fault is now an important
right in the law of negligence and should be available unless stronger
policy considerations would be frustrated.
Gochee v. Wagner abandoned
A long-standing and oft-criticized doctrine whose vitality was questioned after Dole232 is the Gochee v. Wagner233 rule of imputed contributory negligence in vehicular collision cases. The essense of the doctrine is that "[t]he driver's negligence will be imputed to the passenger
to defeat his action whenever the passenger has the exclusive authority
to control the operation of the vehicle, except in a case where the
234
driver himself is the defendant."
The Court of Appeals, in Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., 235
has abandoned the Gochee rule on the ground that it is a "pure legal
fiction, which ... conflicts with public policy." 23 In the classic Gochee
situation, a passenger-owner's action against the driver of the second
car was barred by the imputation to him of his driver's negligence.
This result could, however, be avoided if he initially sued his own
driver, who could then implead the other driver under Dole. Kalechman involved a slight variation of these facts. In this case, the passenger
(P) was an employee of the lessee of the defendant's car, which the passenger's father-in-law (D) was driving. P was killed when the car collided with a truck and an action was commenced on behalf of his
232 See Schwab, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 144,

159 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Schwab]; Munn v. Morris, -42 App. Div. 2d 545, 546, 345
N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 (1st Dep't 1973) (mem.) (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
233 257 N.Y. 344, 178 N.E. 553 (1931).
-

234 Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental, Inc., (1974).
235 Id.
236 Id. at -,
N.E.2d at -,
N.YS.2d at
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